TATC File No. A-3159-60
MoT File No. 5802-139184



Randall Gordon Battison, Applicant

- and -

Minister of Transport, Respondent

Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 7.1(1)(b)

Review Determination
William Thornton Tweed

Decision: January 18, 2006

I confirm the check pilot's decision and the Minister's Notice of Suspension.

A review hearing on this matter was held Wednesday, October 12, 2005 at Robson Square in Vancouver, British Columbia.


On June 11, 2005, the applicants who were candidates for a pilot proficiency check (PPC) on a de Havilland Dash 8 were both assessed by an approved company check pilot as having failed the flight test.

The facts are identical for both files.


The facts of the matter were not at issue. On June 11, 2005, the two applicants, Randall Gordon Battison as pilot-in-command (PIC) and Brice Tristan Arthur Evans as first officer (FO) were flying a scripted PPC ride in a simulator. They were on a two-engine overshoot, during which there was a drop in oil pressure on engine # 1 followed by an oil pressure warning light. The engine was shut down. The shutdown procedure was correct but for the fact that the condition lever was not selected to 1200 RPM as called for in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The aircraft maintained the appropriate altitude and was cruising towards an approach fix at 150 knots.

Both applicants acknowledged that the condition lever had been left at 900 RPM. Both applicants acknowledged that in the circumstance of an inoperative engine they had been trained to advance the condition lever to 1200 RPM and both admitted that the failure to do so was an oversight on their part.

Full power is not available from the operative engine until the condition lever is selected to 1200 RPM. The condition lever was left at 900 RPM.

Approximately 10 minutes after the engine shut down the check pilot assessed a fail and terminated the ride.


The applicants relied on subsection 3.2.2(1) of the de Havilland Inc. Dash 8 Flight Manual (Exhibit A-2) where it states "POWER lever (non-affected engine) – Adjust as required" pointing out that they had selected the required power for the segment of the flight and that the approach check (the next segment) would have resulted in the condition lever being set to 1200 RPM before any additional power was needed.

The applicants argue that notwithstanding their admitted oversight and particularly given the ambiguity between the flight manual and the SOPs, it was not a serious enough error to warrant an assessment of below standard 1, fail.

The Minister pointed out that the PPC was conducted in accordance with a script and that the procedures were carried out in accordance with the Approved Check Pilot Manual.

The check pilot made his determination in a manner consistent with the Approved Check Pilot Manual in particular, the applicants knew the appropriate procedure, they failed to follow the appropriate procedure, and they lacked situational awareness in that the error was not identified and corrected by the crew.


I confirm the check pilot's decision and the Minister's Notice of Suspension.

January 18, 2006

William T. Tweed
Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada