TATC File No. A-3214-60
MoT File No. 5802-404011



Jamey Douglas Davie, Applicant

- and -

Minister of Transport, Respondent

Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 7.1(1)(b)

Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC)

Review Determination
William Thornton Tweed

Decision: August 28, 2006

The Minister's decision to suspend First Officer Jamey Douglas Davie's pilot proficiency check is upheld.

[1]     A review hearing on this matter was held April 11, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. in Vancouver, British Columbia.


[2]     October 20, 2005, Jamey Douglas Davie, a first officer with Air Canada Jazz, was undergoing a pilot proficiency check (PPC) for the CL-65 (RJ) in the simulator. The performance was assessed as a fail and his CL-65 PPC was suspended. First Officer Davie is appealing that failure.


[3]     The flight test was conducted pursuant to a "scripted ride" by Captain Eric William King, an approved company check pilot, duly authorized to conduct the ride for Transport Canada. Captain King assessed the fail because First Officer Davie, while acting as the pilot not flying (PNF), missed certain required calls.

[4]     The first incident was on a missed approach. The pilot flying (PF) called for the autopilot. The PNF selected the autopilot, but the autopilot did not engage. The PNF did not check and call autopilot engaged. The crew did not become aware that the autopilot was off until the aircraft was close to the missed approach altitude and the aircraft had rolled approximately 40 degrees to the right. The PF recognized the situation that led to the roll and levelled the aircraft and continued with the script for a category 3 approach and landing which was uneventful.

[5]     The second incident was on an approach. The autopilot disengaged and the aircraft moved a full needle deflection off the localizer before the problem was recognized and a go-around initiated.

[6]     The ride was being observed by John Dorward, a representative of International Air Transport Association who was conducting an audit on Air Canada Jazz.


[7]     The Minister states that in both incidents, First Officer Davie, the PNF, was responsible for the monitoring of the systems. In the first incident, the PF called for the autopilot; the PNF selected the autopilot, but did not confirm by a "call" that the autopilot had engaged. In the second incident, the autopilot went offline and the aircraft drifted a full needle deflection to the right of the localizer before the problem was recognized and a missed approach initiated.

[8]     First Officer Davie, the PNF, did not monitor the systems and recognize the autopilot was offline or call when the aircraft started to move off the localizer. Captain King determined that First Officer Davie's performance was below standard and assessed a failure. First Officer Davie disputes this assessment and states that his performance met the basic standard in that they were merely excursions beyond limits, but they were recognized and corrected in a timely manner. He states that in the first incident the aircraft turning to the right and rolling to 25 degrees was what was to be expected. It was not until that roll continued beyond 25 degrees that the problem was recognized and corrected by the PF. That explanation does not satisfactorily explain why he did follow the standard operating procedure and confirm that the autopilot had engaged and advised the PF of that fact, or in this case, that the autopilot did not engage. Had he followed the procedure the problem would have been recognized in a more timely manner. As to the second incident, he says that they were off the localizer for approximately 20-25 seconds and that he was assisting the PF with the overshoot procedure. His explanation does not address the issue as to why Mr. Davie, the PNF, failed to recognize that the autopilot was offline and advise the PF of that fact.


[9]     In the first incident, the fact that the PF recognized that the autopilot was not engaged as the aircraft rolled 25 degrees does not relieve the PNF of his duties to confirm that the autopilot engaged after it was selected and call that fact to the PF. As for the second incident, First Officer Davie, the PNF, did not realize the autopilot was offline nor did he alert the PF that the aircraft was moving off the localizer. A drift of a full needle deflection off the localizer does not meet the required standard. The subsequent overshoot, which Captain King acknowledged was an appropriate recovery, does not address the PNF's lack of situational awareness during the approach.

[10]     Although it is possible that the presence of an observer could add to the stress level, there is no evidence to support an allegation that Captain King's decision making was influenced by the observer. The evidence shows that Captain King exercised his discretion in a manner consistent with his mandate of approved check pilot and the Approved Check Pilot Manual.

[11]     I, therefore, confirm the Minister's decision to suspend First Officer Jamey Douglas Davie's PPC.

August 28, 2006

William T. Tweed
Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada